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CloudDev AI threat model

Executive summary

CloudDev AI is a single-operator cloud workspace. Its largest risks are theft of workspace or Git credentials, malicious repository content executing with the workspace user's permissions, outbound data transfer from an agent, and unverified upstream dependencies in the public OmniRoute dashboard. The local runtime has separate browser-cookie and SSH-key entry points, but it is not a sandbox for hostile code. The OmniRoute image uses a pinned release whose Next.js version is within published advisory ranges. Some affected features are disabled or mitigated in the upstream build, but the Marketplace release gate remains open until the image is rebuilt or replaced with a fully verified patched release.

Scope and assumptions

In scope are the root Docker Compose stack, .railway/railway.ts, the shared workspace service, the launchpad auth gateway, Forgejo, PostgreSQL, OmniRoute, and their tests and security documentation. The intended production shape is one isolated Railway project per operator. No live Railway project, public domain, or Marketplace template is linked to this checkout. Compose uses loopback HTTP for local testing. Railway HTTPS, domain rules, generated secret values, and TCP proxy endpoints still require a fresh-project read-back.

Assumptions that affect this model:

  • The operator is the only human with an account in the deployment. The model does not cover adding a second shell user.
  • Browser traffic reaches the workspace through Railway HTTPS. Forgejo and OmniRoute retain their own sign-in systems.
  • The operator-provisioned SSH private key remains on the desktop client. Its public key is installed as a root-owned file outside /workspace.
  • A coding agent may run arbitrary shell commands, read files available to UID 1000, and make outbound network requests. Railway private networking does not restrict egress.
  • Provider API use can send prompts, source excerpts, tool output, and other context to the selected provider. Provider location and retention depend on the account and terms the operator selects.
  • Backup restore, physical phone acceptance, Windows Remote-SSH, and a fresh Railway deploy have not been proven by this local model.

Questions that would change risk rankings include the sensitivity of project data, provider contracts and retention, the operator's chosen public domains, and whether the deployment will be used from untrusted networks or shared with another person.

System model

Primary components

  • clouddev-ide combines code-server, CloudCLI, the launchpad, Codex CLI, Claude Code CLI, Caddy, and key-only OpenSSH. The application processes run under distinct service UIDs except CloudCLI, code-server, and agents, which share UID 1000.
  • One volume at /workspace contains the persistent home, projects, agent configuration, task registry, and CloudCLI database. The mount root is root-owned and traversable. Home and project directories remain owned by coder.
  • The launchpad runs as UID 1002. It issues the browser session cookie, checks Caddy's loopback forward-auth request, and exposes only public service status, the SSH fingerprint, and aggregate recovery counts.
  • clouddev-git runs Forgejo with registration disabled, private repositories by default, and PostgreSQL for its relational state. Its Git SSH service is separate from the workspace shell.
  • clouddev-postgres has no public listener.
  • clouddev-router is an upstream OmniRoute 3.8.52 image pinned by digest, wrapped to include the local health probe. It stores encrypted provider configuration in a persistent SQLite volume. The inference port remains private and requires an API key.
  • Railway's edge provides public HTTPS. Railway TCP Proxy provides explicit TCP endpoints for workspace SSH and optional Forgejo Git SSH.

Data flows and trust boundaries

  • Browser -> Railway HTTPS -> Caddy: workspace cookie, UI requests, project content, and CloudCLI Bearer token. Caddy verifies the signed cookie through the loopback launchpad. forward_auth uses a separate derived internal key and does not replace the request's Authorization header. The sign-in form checks the request origin and redirects only to local paths.
  • Caddy -> CloudCLI and code-server: HTTP over loopback. The internal listeners have no public domain or Compose host mapping. CloudCLI's own account/JWT remains an application-level check for its API.
  • Caddy -> launchpad: HTTP over loopback. Caddy can call the private /auth/verify route. The route rejects requests without the internal key. The launchpad process receives the workspace password and signing secret; it runs as UID 1002, separately from UID 1000 agents.
  • Native VS Code -> Railway TCP Proxy -> sshd: SSH with a user-provisioned Ed25519 key and the persistent host-key fingerprint. sshd rejects password, keyboard-interactive, root, agent, X11, tunnel, and remote-forwarding access. Local forwarding is limited to loopback for Remote-SSH.
  • Agent -> /workspace: ordinary filesystem access as UID 1000. A process can read or change every file available to the workspace user, including the restricted gateway key and Forgejo Git private key needed for work.
  • Agent -> OmniRoute inference API: private-network HTTP with a scoped API key. OmniRoute forwards model requests to the chosen provider. The workspace has no provider master key. The API endpoint is not public; egress from the workspace is not filtered.
  • Workspace -> Forgejo: HTTPS or SSH with a regular account's Git identity. The Forgejo administrator token is not in the IDE environment.
  • Forgejo -> PostgreSQL: private service traffic with a least-privilege application role. PostgreSQL has no public domain.
  • Railway operator -> service variables and Composer: deployment credentials, generated service secrets, domain and TCP proxy configuration. A Railway project token is not passed to workspace processes.

Diagram

flowchart LR
  Desktop["VS Code Desktop"] --> Ssh["Key-only SSH"]
  Mobile["Mobile browser"] --> Edge["HTTPS edge"]
  Browser["Browser VS Code"] --> Edge
  Edge --> Caddy["Workspace proxy"]
  Caddy --> Launchpad["Launchpad auth"]
  Caddy --> CloudCLI["CloudCLI"]
  Caddy --> CodeServer["code-server"]
  Ssh --> Workspace["Shared workspace"]
  CloudCLI --> Workspace
  CodeServer --> Workspace
  Workspace --> Router["OmniRoute private API"]
  Router --> Provider["Selected AI provider"]
  Workspace --> Forgejo["Forgejo"]
  Forgejo --> Postgres["PostgreSQL"]

Assets and security objectives

Asset Why it matters Security objective
Project files and Git working trees Source, credentials accidentally stored by the operator, and work product C, I, A
Workspace SSH private key on desktop Grants a shell in the user's persistent workspace C, I
Workspace SSH host private key Authenticates the persistent host across restarts I
Workspace password and cookie secret Authorize browser access to the workspace C, I
CloudCLI account JWT and session database Authorize agent sessions and preserve history C, I, A
Restricted OmniRoute inference key Enables billable requests through configured models C, A
Forgejo Git private key and account Enables repository fetch and push C, I
Forgejo admin password and database role Controls forge and Git data C, I, A
OmniRoute provider credentials and encryption key Control AI providers and encrypted database recovery C, I, A
Task registry and provider transcripts Support status and user-initiated recovery after restarts I, A
Backup archives and Railway secrets Restore all state and regain service control C, I, A

C, I, and A denote confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Attacker model

Capabilities

  • A remote attacker can probe public browser endpoints, Forgejo, OmniRoute's dashboard, and the workspace SSH TCP proxy.
  • An attacker who steals the workspace password or browser session can use the workspace web interfaces until the credential or session is revoked.
  • An attacker who obtains the operator's SSH private key can access the workspace shell as coder.
  • A malicious repository or prompt can cause an authorized agent to execute commands, inspect accessible files, alter projects, and make outbound requests.
  • A compromised browser origin can act with the victim's workspace session.
  • A bad update or unpatched upstream package can expose a public service or break session recovery.

Non-capabilities

  • There is no shared multi-tenant workspace or cross-project user boundary in this deployment model.
  • An ordinary workspace agent does not run as root and receives no Docker socket, Railway token, Forgejo administrator token, or provider master key.
  • Railway's private network is not an egress sandbox and must not be modeled as one.
  • A persistent volume does not preserve in-memory processes or guarantee an active agent task survives a Railway restart.

Entry points and attack surfaces

Surface How reached Trust boundary Notes Evidence
Workspace cookie login Public HTTPS /auth/login Internet to launchpad auth Origin checked, rate-limited, signed cookie services/launchpad/src/workspace-auth.mjs:createWorkspaceAuth
Workspace UI routes HTTPS /, /vscode/, /launchpad/ Internet to Caddy and loopback upstreams Forward-auth cookie check; /healthz is generic liveness services/ide/Caddyfile.template
Workspace SSH Railway TCP proxy to 2222 Internet to sshd Ed25519 only; host fingerprint is persistent services/ide/sshd_config, services/ide/src/install-authorized-keys.mjs
Forgejo web and API Public HTTPS domain Internet to Forgejo login Registration disabled; repository access requires login services/forgejo/entrypoint.sh
Forgejo Git SSH Optional TCP proxy to 2222 Internet to Forgejo SSH Git-only identity; distinct proxy from workspace SSH docker-compose.yml, services/forgejo/entrypoint.sh
OmniRoute dashboard Workspace HTTPS /omniroute/ path Internet through workspace cookie gate, then OmniRoute native login Upstream application and dependency risk remains services/ide/Caddyfile.template, services/omniroute/Dockerfile
OmniRoute inference API Private dashboard port 20128 through the workspace loopback adapter Workspace and router Requires a scoped key; only the adapter is reachable by agents services/ide/Caddyfile.template, services/omniroute/README.md
Agent filesystem and shell SSH, code-server terminal, CloudCLI UID 1000 to persistent workspace Untrusted tasks run as the workspace user services/ide/src/service-environment.mjs, services/ide/src/terminal-agent.mjs
Railway Composer and variables Operator dashboard Operator to control plane Domains, secret generators, and live sleep state require Composer/read-back .railway/README.md

Top abuse paths

  1. A remote attacker obtains the workspace password through phishing or a compromised device, signs in, then reads or changes projects through CloudCLI or browser VS Code.
  2. A device backup or terminal log leaks the operator SSH private key. An attacker connects through the public TCP proxy and gains the workspace user's filesystem and shell permissions.
  3. A malicious repository instruction persuades an agent to inspect its workspace. The agent reads the scoped inference and Git keys, then uses outbound HTTPS to exfiltrate them or push malicious changes.
  4. A malicious commit or extension exploits the shared UID 1000 process boundary. The attacker changes projects, configuration, shell startup files, or other state accessible to the workspace account.
  5. A vulnerable or unauthenticated OmniRoute dashboard route is exposed on a generated public domain. An attacker exploits upstream framework code or steals the operator's OmniRoute session and changes provider/API-key state.
  6. A provider or external integration returns malicious content. CloudCLI, OmniRoute, or an agent processes it, causing script injection or command execution with the privileges of that component.
  7. A Railway restart terminates a long-running agent process. If the operator assumes the process continued and blindly replays the prompt, it can cause duplicate or conflicting changes.
  8. The operator loses a volume or encryption key and discovers that no off-project restore was tested. Git, workspace, database, or provider state becomes unavailable.

Threat model table

Threat ID Threat source Prerequisites Threat action Impact Impacted assets Existing controls (evidence) Gaps Recommended mitigations Detection ideas Likelihood Impact severity Priority
TM-001 Internet attacker or stolen browser device Workspace password or cookie is obtained Uses browser routes to inspect, change, or delete workspace data Full access to the single operator's workspace Files, sessions, Git key, inference key Launchpad signs 8-hour HttpOnly SameSite cookies; production sets Secure; login checks Origin; Caddyfile.template gates UI routes No MFA; password rotation and cookie revocation need operator action Use a password manager, rotate password and CLOUDDEV_WORKSPACE_AUTH_SECRET after exposure, keep public TLS enabled, consider IP/VPN restrictions Alert on unusual login attempts and edge access spikes; current app emits no password or prompt logs Medium High high
TM-002 Attacker with stolen operator SSH key Private key file or its backup is exposed Connects to public workspace TCP proxy and obtains a shell as coder Reads/changes all workspace data and can use scoped tokens Workspace files, session history, Git and inference credentials Root-owned key list outside the volume; key-only sshd; persistent host fingerprint; local verifier compares fingerprint Key is generated without passphrase by the local helper; no MFA on SSH Protect desktop key with OS keychain/passphrase, rotate authorized keys, verify host fingerprint through trusted HTTPS Record SSH auth failures and rotate after unknown fingerprints Low to medium High high
TM-003 Malicious repo content or prompt Operator runs an agent on the content Agent reads accessible secrets, alters Git state, or makes outbound requests Source theft, malicious push, provider spend Projects, inference key, Git key, cloud data Agents run without capabilities as UID 1000; admin secrets are excluded; no Docker socket; scripts are not auto-run on clone Same UID means mode 0600 does not protect keys from the agent; no egress enforcement Treat repo content as code, review diffs, restrict inference key models, avoid storing credentials in projects, use a real egress policy if required Review Git audit/activity logs and provider usage anomalies High High high
TM-004 Malicious or compromised browser script A same-origin XSS or compromised browser dependency Reads user-visible project data or performs authenticated actions Workspace confidentiality or integrity loss Browser session, project data Cookie HttpOnly, CSP on launchpad, no browser-delivered secrets in the launchpad Upstream CloudCLI and OmniRoute frontends have independent dependency and XSS risk Keep upstreams patched; audit rendered Markdown/HTML and extension policies; maintain CSP and dependency scans Monitor upstream advisories and browser errors Medium High high
TM-005 Upstream OmniRoute vulnerability Public dashboard domain is enabled and vulnerable feature reachable Exploits vulnerable Next.js/image route or sanitizer behavior Router compromise or dashboard session compromise Provider credentials, inference keys, SQLite data, prompts Base image is digest-pinned; sharp 0.35.5 is present; upstream config sets images unoptimized, disallows SVG optimization, and disables cache components Image's Next.js 16.3.8 is within published advisory ranges. A runtime-only override to 16.4.3 failed because its prebuilt artifacts did not match. This does not count as a patch. Keep release blocked until upstream publishes a patched image or a full-source rebuild has updated dependencies and passes health, auth, inference, and dependency checks Track Next.js and OmniRoute advisories; compare image/package versions during release Medium Critical high
TM-006 Unauthenticated browser/API caller A route bypasses the Caddy cookie gate or an application auth check Reaches CloudCLI, code-server, Forgejo, or inference without valid auth Unauthorized sessions, Git access, or provider use CloudCLI DB, private repositories, inference API Caddy cookie forward-auth; SSH public key; Forgejo requires sign-in; OmniRoute inference requires API key; local tests check 401/302 Live Composer domains and edge/TCP behavior are unverified Keep all browser domains behind the intended service auth, keep inference private, read back domains/TCP proxies after deployment Run unauthenticated route probes on every deploy Low to medium High high
TM-007 Railway process restart or volume fault Active work or unverified backup state Stops in-memory task or loses a volume/database Interrupted work or unrecoverable state Workspace, Git, session history, router config Persistent volumes; registry marks running jobs interrupted; no auto-replay; backups are documented Live restart, recovery, and restore drills remain open Snapshot/backup each store, run isolated restores, resume only from provider-supported history Alert on interrupted task counts and backup failures Medium High high
TM-008 External AI provider or network recipient Agent sends project context or provider receives prompt Retains, trains on, or transfers submitted content under its own policy Data transfer outside Railway EU West Source, prompts, personal or confidential data Operator chooses provider; logs minimize prompt capture; provider master key remains in OmniRoute Provider region, retention, and legal terms vary; egress is not filtered Review provider terms/DPA and data residency, minimize prompts, do not send regulated data without approval Review provider dashboards and contract changes Medium High high
TM-009 Operator configuration error Composer enables a wrong domain, public port, or sleep setting Exposes a service, breaks client access, or stops the workspace Unauthorized access or availability loss All services and persistent data IaC declares EU West, volumes, one replica, and no sleep; README lists Composer settings No live Railway project/read-back exists Use a fresh test project, review the plan, verify every domain, port, volume, region, and sleep flag Keep a release checklist and deployment read-back Medium High high
TM-010 Malicious browser request or automation Agent or attacker can reach workspace public routes Attempts CSRF against cookie-authenticated login/logout or UI Session confusion or unwanted logout Workspace cookie and UI Strict SameSite cookie; login POST checks same-origin; logout checks same-origin; URL redirects are restricted Cookie/auth routes have local unit tests, but browser/production HTTPS acceptance remains incomplete Keep origin checks and add end-to-end auth tests over Railway HTTPS Monitor auth failures and verify cookie flags from a clean browser Low Medium medium

Criticality calibration

  • Critical: an unauthenticated public route can execute code in the OmniRoute container; a leaked provider master key grants broad provider account access.
  • High: a stolen workspace SSH key permits full access to the single operator's workspace; an agent exfiltrates a scoped inference key or pushes malicious repository changes.
  • Medium: a Railway restart interrupts a task but persistent files remain; a provider retains submitted code under its own policy.
  • Low: an unauthenticated health endpoint reveals only that a service is alive; a stale non-secret SSH fingerprint display causes a failed first connection without granting access.

These ratings assume one operator, public browser/SSH endpoints, private service networking, and no egress firewall. The OmniRoute dependency threat is release-blocking because it affects a public dashboard service; exploitability of each advisory depends on the corresponding upstream route and feature.

Focus paths for security review

Path Why it matters Related Threat IDs
services/ide/entrypoint.sh Creates service identities, mount permissions, host keys, and sanitized environments TM-002, TM-003, TM-009
services/ide/sshd_config Defines public SSH authentication and forwarding policy TM-002
services/ide/Caddyfile.template Defines cookie forward-auth coverage and browser routing TM-001, TM-006
services/launchpad/src/workspace-auth.mjs Validates password, origin, signed cookie, redirects, and Caddy auth checks TM-001, TM-010
services/ide/src/service-environment.mjs Controls which secrets each isolated UID receives TM-001, TM-003
services/ide/src/terminal-agent.mjs Starts detached provider tasks under the workspace identity TM-003, TM-007
services/ide/src/task-registry.mjs Persists minimal task state and recovery transitions TM-007
services/forgejo/entrypoint.sh Provisions PostgreSQL role and first administrator; disables registration TM-006, TM-009
services/omniroute/Dockerfile Pins the upstream router base image and health behavior TM-005
.railway/railway.ts Declares regions, volumes, ports, replicas, references, and no-sleep behavior TM-009

Notes on use

  • Entry points covered: browser cookie login and UI routes, workspace SSH, Forgejo web/API/Git SSH, OmniRoute dashboard/inference, private PostgreSQL, agent shell/filesystem, and Railway Composer.
  • Trust boundaries covered: public edge, cookie gateway, SSH, service UIDs, private networking, provider APIs, persistent storage, and operator control plane.
  • Runtime, local Compose, IaC, and unverified live Railway settings are distinguished. No live deployment or restore is claimed.
  • The pinned router source has specific upstream mitigation settings, but no patched full-image rebuild or public production auth test has completed.